Nov 25, The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading. Self-Knowledge has 14 ratings and 3 reviews. Sara said: A good intro to a still very new subject but the author was really very biased in her analysis of. Feb 7, In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers to knowledge of one’s . in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation (Gertler ;.
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This is because how a phenomenal state appears epistemically and how it actually is its ontology or nature are, according to many philosophers, one and the same.
Just a moment while we sign tertler in to your Goodreads account. The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of MJCBorsuk added it Mar 21, On the ISA view, interpretation is not required for such knowledge, or for knowledge of any state that can be recognized solely on the basis of raw sensory data, since sensory data are the inputs to the mindreading system.
Kind contends that these arguments do not directly threaten inner sense accounts.
Self-Knowledge by Brie Gertler (ebook)
Epistemic internalists will be particularly likely to harbor doubts on this score. Strikingly, their disagreement about the reliability of introspection remains even after their lengthy discussion of the results. A Defense of Empiricism Brie Gertler. The purported epistemic and metaphysical directness of introspection does not imply that we are either infallible or omniscient about our own states, since it is an open question whether we routinely engage in introspection.
According to the reasons account, a conscious state can serve as a reason for belief or action, even if the thinker is not conscious of the state. Statement 1 identifies the distinctive feature of self-knowledge as the epistemic status of a certain class of beliefs, whereas statement 2 identifies it by the method one uses in forming these beliefs.
The core of neo-expressivism is its non-epistemic account of phenomena often associated with self-knowledge, namely, first-person authority. Science Logic and Mathematics. If psychological states are theoretical entities, both self-attributions and other-attributions will proceed by inference from observed data—presumably, behavior.
Like Burge and Moran, Bilgrami regards self-knowledge as intimately tied to the phenomenon of rational agency.
They simply aim to explain the provenance of privileged self-attributions, by identifying processes that could generate self-attributions with the epistemic features characteristic of self-knowledge. Williamson imagines a subject who feels cold at dawn, but gradually warms until she feels warm at noon. Tucker rated it really liked it Jun 11, Further Reading Anthologies on self-knowledge: In order to satisfy these rational norms—e. On this account, the transition from deciding to do something or remembering that one has so decided to believing that one intends to do that thing is rational, since it is a conceptual truth that deciding normally suffices for intending.
But this is a very difficult rule to observe, at least with regard to sensations. According to these accounts, the transparency of mental states provides for an exclusively first-personal method of knowing them, and explains the special security of self-attributions. This paper has two goals.
Epistemic Norms in Epistemology.
But they maintain that the need for observation signals that the attitude is problematic. Schwitzgebel has marshalled other sorts of empirical evidence to show that introspective reports are unreliable. But inner sense accounts allow that introspection also differs from perception in significant ways. Jack Davis is currently reading it Getrler 13, Doubts about the distinctiveness of self-knowledge 2.
I would subdivide the problem into two parts.
An itch can serve as a reason for scratching, even if there is no further conscious state distinct from the itch that constitutes an awareness of the itch.
George Allen and Unwin. Its Validity and its Sources. He argues knoweldge a mental state, and a self-attribution of that state, can share a single basis. What is relevant to the most famous philosophical argument involving self-knowledge gerfler not these general relations but, rather, the certainty of a particular instance of belief.
Andreas Forslund is currently reading it Nov 24, Some deny the assumption that recognizing a relationally defined state requires identifying the relational properties that make it the state that it is Burge ; Heil The treatment is well-organized, comprehensive, fair and balanced, and I hope it might get even more students and philosophers to be intrigued by this philosophical conversation.
It also gives historical background of great interest in itself and also helpful for framing the contemporary controversies. Schwitzgebel,Describing Inner Experience?
If having a sensation generally allows the subject to form a self-attributing belief that appropriately incorporates that sensation, then feeling cold may be luminous after all. In effect, this objection denies that introspective attention to an instance of a phenomenal quality can provide for an understanding of that quality adequate for genuine factual knowledge. The Mechanics of Self-Knowledge.
But Is It Art? It is metaphysically direct in that no event or process mediates between my awareness and the mental state itself. Mandy rated it liked it Oct 12, A Study of Self-KnowledgeOxford: Brie Gertler is a philosopher who works primarily on problems in the philosophy of the mind. If we restrict the relevant domain to beliefs formed by use of a method that is exclusively a method of attaining self -knowledge—perhaps introspection —we can formulate a more plausible infallibility thesis.
Insofar as rationalist accounts invoke highly demanding conceptions of rationality, one may reasonably wonder whether they truly describes the situation of cognitively flawed creatures like us.